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Abstract:   At the time that India’s liberalization, the Reliance group was already one of India’s 
leading business groups and in subsequent years has only cemented its place at the top of 
India’s corporate hierarchy. Reliance was not, however, among the ‘traditional’ large groups 
that emerged during the colonial era and were found to be still dominant in the mid-1960s. 
This paper traces the story of the Reliance phenomenon and discusses briefly the process 
(method) by which that story was constructed. In addition to demystifying the phenomenon, the 
paper seeks to demonstrate that there is sufficient evidence available to establish the 
proposition that the basis for the success of Reliance was fundamentally no different from that 
which other groups used to perpetuate their dominant position, the roots of which lay in the 
nature of Indian capitalism. 
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Introduction 
A fundamental premise of this paper is that the capitalist or business class in any 
society is a product of its particular historical development. Its character is, therefore, 
not only variable across societies but can also change in any society over the course of 
its development. Changes in the composition of the class is one of the mechanisms 
through which such transformations of its character can be affected. This paper makes 
use of a case study of the pre-liberalization rise of a new business group to derive 
insights about the nature of the contemporary Indian capitalist class and the extent to 
which it shed its original character and became more industrial in nature before 
India’s opening up process began in 1991. 
India’s modern capitalist class was born in very specific conditions of a colonial 
economy, emerging from a mercantile background and initially under the shadow of 
foreign dominance even in the sphere of business (Ray 1994). For nearly a century 
after it came into being, its development was constrained by the extremely limited 
growth of modern factory industry that was permitted by colonial conditions. A 
domestic market based process after independence saw industrial development being 
relatively more rapid and diverse after independence. Yet India never quite made the 
transition to being an industrialized economy before Indian capitalists came to 
confront a new competitive context with India’s full-scale entry into the Globalization 
process (Mazumdar 2008). Through this period, big business in India remained 
mainly family controlled and usually organized in the specific form of the business 
group. 
While the overall extent of industrialization between independence and the onset of 
liberalization in 1991 remained limited, it was accompanied by a marked continuity as 
well as important shifts in the composition of Indian big business (Mazumdar 2011). 
Notwithstanding the continued dominance of older elements within them, entry into 
and exit from the large business sector as well as a significant reordering of relative 
positions did take place over that period. These changes contradict the commonly held 
view that the competitive context created by the regulatory regime of Indian dirigisme 
was tailor made to perpetuate the reproduction of a traditional Indian business elite as 
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it protected them from competition from new entrants. However, the change in the 
composition does not by itself tell us if there was any fundamental transformation in 
the nature of the capitalist class.   
Of the new groups that emerged in the large business sector, the Reliance group was 
the most important representative. The story of its rise to the top ranks of Indian 
business groups belonged to the period after independence and to the pre-1991 era of 
Indian capitalism. Its history was not traceable backwards to any old business firm of 
the pre-independence period. Yet, by 1990 Reliance was already among the largest of 
Indian private business groups, behind only the Tata and Birla (unified) groups in 
terms of assets commanded. Understanding the basis for the success of Reliance in the 
context of rivalry with older established constituents of the capitalist class can thus 
throw up some insights about the nature of the change whose expression was that 
growth.  
The method used to construct the story of the Reliance phenomenon in this paper 
involved the mutually interacting processes of putting together of detailed evidence 
derived from a variety of available sources and finding a plausible interpretation of all 
that evidence. Insights available from major studies undertaken in the 1960s (Hazari 
1966; Government of India 1969) into the structure of business groups, the ways of 
identifying linkages within a group and some of their implications proved to be 
specifically important for this exercise. Our method may be contrasted with a 
different approach prevalent in some of the current international literature on business 
groups in ‘emerging markets’. (Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan 2002; Khanna and 
Ghemawat 1998; Khanna and Palepu 2000 and 2005; Khanna and Rivkin 2001; 
Khanna and Yafeh 2007; Leff 1978). Eschewing the task of putting together detailed 
concrete evidence on such groups, the approach in these studies tends to be one of 
using anecdotal observations to construct explanatory models and derive hypotheses 
about the behaviour of groups that are then sometimes ‘tested’ against the readily 
available statistical evidence.  
It should, however, be emphasized that this study has been based entirely on 
information and data accessible from publicly available documents (details are given 
in the bibliography). Extensive use was made of the statutorily filings with the 
Registrar of Companies and annual reports of some of its major companies (including 
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their balance sheets and profit and loss accounts). Records of over a hundred 
companies were examined in the process. In addition, information was culled from 
reports of India’s Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) commission or 
the Bureau of Industrial Costs and Prices and other official reports, as well as some 
prepared by different industry associations. The academic literature existing on the 
subject and the available official data sources were used to prepare the background 
story of the textile and petrochemical industries in India as well as internationally. 
The Bombay Stock Exchange Official Directory also provided a lot of information on 
the history of many companies engaged in these industries. Of course, what has been 
extracted from all these sources can only be presented in summary form in this paper1.    
Confidential insider information or interviews of either those involved with the 
Reliance group or those who dealt with it in any official capacity could, if available, 
have been of course used as additional material. Some such information is available in 
published biographical accounts available (McDonald 1998; Mohnot 1987; Piramal 
1997; Piramal and Herdeck 1984). However, this study does not rely excessively on 
these sources. Part of the reason for this is simply that independent access to reliable 
material of this kind to add to or corroborate what was available in existing accounts 
would not have been easy to get. Such material could in any case not have completely 
substituted for the information gathered from the sources mentioned earlier. This was 
all the more so since one of the objectives of this study was also to shift attention 
from a virtually exclusive focus on the innate and highly exceptional abilities of a 
particular individual and to demystify the Reliance phenomenon by bringing out the 
combination of historical forces that produced it. Directing the effort towards the also 
significantly difficult task of putting together what was available in the public domain 
but scattered across a variety of sources thus seemed to be the better route to take. 
Reinforcing this choice were two important things. The first is the eventual outcome 
that it was possible to say a a lot based on the evidence compiled. Further, this more 
reliable evidence was also found to be contradicting some impressions that have 
acquired the status of being ‘facts’ – for instance the myth that Reliance was forced to 
                                                 
1 More details are available in Mazumdar (2006) 
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resort to capital issues because it could not get credit from public sector financial 
institutions2.  
The Reliance group in 1990 
Like other Indian groups, the Reliance stable too had a large number of companies 
(close to 200) though only 10 companies and 5 partnership/ proprietorship firms, were 
registered under the then existing MRTP Act as inter-connected undertakings of the 
group. Most of these companies were primarily investment and trading companies and 
the group’s manufacturing activities were concentrated in a small number of 
companies – the bulk of it in the one major public company, namely Reliance 
Industries, and its two subsidiaries. Moreover, manufacturing was the principal 
business activity and while the large number of investment and trading companies 
performed important functions, investment and trading were only nominally their 
business and not the actual reasons for which they existed. They were interconnected 
to each other through cross-holdings and common directors. Many of them in turn 
together held a fifth of the share capital of Reliance Industries and this constituted the 
major part of the stake through which the Ambani family exercised control over the 
company (the direct holding by the family being less than one per cent). A summary 
and approximate presentation of the structure of inter-corporate investments within the 
Reliance Group is shown in Figures 1A and 1B, incorporating 141 companies and based 
on shareholding information for the period 1983 to 1990. 
While the key figure associated with the rise of Reliance was Dhirubhai Ambani, a 
larger extended family including not only his two sons but also the immediate 
families of his brothers, Natvarlal and Ramniklal, as well as their relations by 
marriage formed a large and cohesive controlling group. While Reliance was not an 
inherited family business, the Ambani family belonged to a mercantile caste group 
and their social network had always included wealthy members of their community 
(Macdonald 1998).   
                                                 
2 Khanna and Palepu (2005) citing India Unbound: From Independence to the Global 
Information Age by Gurcharan Das. 
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In Reliance Industries family members occupied the positions of Chairman, Managing 
and Joint Managing Directors and Executive Directors in 1990. Another director was 
T Ramesh U. Pai was from the Manipal group with which Reliance had a long 
association. Two other directors, Jayantilal R. Shah and Mansingh L. Bhakta, had also 
been directors of the company from the time it was still a private limited company 
(before 1977). Indeed, the Board of Directors of Reliance Industries in 1990 did not 
look very different from what it had been nearly a decade and a half before. The 
Secretary of the company was also the same, as were the auditors and the advocates 
and solicitors3. 
Reliance’s manufacturing activities were by the end of the 1980s largely concentrated 
in petrochemicals – with polyester and polyester intermediates forming the core but 
with a greater diversification under way. While this gave it a strong linkage with the 
textile industry, the textiles side proper of Reliance’s manufacturing portfolio 
accounted for less than a fifth of its sales in 1990. It was also in petrochemical 
products that Reliance had achieved the status of being the leading firm in a range of 
industries – accounting for a significant (mostly largest) share in installed capacity, 
production and sales of Polyester Filament Yarn, Polyester Staple Fibre, Linear Alkyl 
Benzene, Purified Terepthalic Acid and Paraxylene (Tables 1 and 2). Thus it was not 
only big in an aggregate sense but was also a dominant firm in its industries of 
operation. 
Brief history of the Reliance group 
The commercial history of the Reliance group began with the creation of Reliance 
Commercial Corporation, a partnership firm, in 1958. From then on till 1966, when 
Reliance Textiles and Engineers Ltd. was registered, the group had apparently no 
manufacturing activity and was engaged only in trading. Reliance Textiles and 
Engineers was also the first joint-stock company of the group. This was also thereafter 
always its most important company, being the entity that eventually became Reliance 
                                                 
3 The founder of one of the auditing firms, D.N. Chaturvedi, was supposed to be part of the 
inner think-tank of the Reliance group (Mohnot 1987).  
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Industries Ltd. in 19854.  Its growth served as the barometer for the growth of the entire 
group after 1966. Till 1977 it was a private limited company, going public in that year. 
In terms of its organizational features therefore, three phases of the growth of the 
Reliance group up to 1990 may initially be distinguished: 1958 to 1966, when it 
operated through partnership or proprietorship firms; 1966 to 1977, when first one 
and then a few other narrowly held private limited companies were added to the 
group’s stable; and 1977 to 1990, the period in which the principal group company 
became an extremely widely held public limited company, and there was a rapid 
proliferation in the number of companies in the group.  
The incorporation of the first joint-stock company of the group neatly coincides with 
the entry of the Reliance group into manufacturing. However, the subsequent period 
till 1990 can also be divided into two phases on a different basis whose dividing line is 
1982. Prior to Reliance going public, and for a period subsequent to that, Reliance’s 
principal involvement was in the textile industries. In the 1980s, the focus shifted to 
polyester and other petrochemicals, and these became the locus of its growth from 1982 
onwards and gave rise to the picture in 1990 that has been described before. Thus the 
period till 1982 may be called the textiles phase of Reliance’s growth and the subsequent 
period the polyester fibres/petrochemicals phase. However, it may be noted that the 
textiles phase after 1977 was not just a mere expansion of past activities, and the same 
was also true of the polyester/petrochemicals phase from 1986. There was also an 
essential continuity that accompanied each transition and aided it.  
1958 to 1966: The trading phase 
Reliance Commercial Corporation (RCC) began its business activities with the export 
of spices and other items to the Middle East and East Africa (Mohnot 1986; Piramal & 
Herdeck 1984). Somewhere along the line the trading activities were extended to 
include textiles. By the mid-sixties, Reliance’s business involvement with the textile and 
man-made fibres industry, in particular with what was known as the ‘art silk’ industry, 
would appear to have been fairly deep. Though the art silk industry in those days was an 
                                                 
4 Incorporated as Reliance Textiles and Engineers Ltd., it was eventually transformed into 
Reliance Textile Industries Ltd. before finally acquiring the name Reliance Industries Ltd. 
Technically however there was a discontinuity in between which is explained shortly.  
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export oriented industry, and was given various incentives by the Government for that 
reason, Reliance’s primary focus in this period was not really on exports of rayon textiles 
but on the domestic market for synthetic fibres. ‘Exports’ were simply the instrument for 
taking advantage of the incentives and acquiring synthetic fibres whose production in 
India had not yet taken off in India though their use in the manufacture of fabrics had 
acquired proportions of some significance. Thus the early history of the Reliance group 
coincided with the incipient stages of the development of the synthetic fibres and textiles 
industry in India. 
1966 to 1977: The first textile phase 
Subsequent to the coming into being of Reliance Textiles and Engineers the Reliance 
group incorporated only 5 other companies before 1977 - Reliance Exports (1969), 
Vimal Fabrics (1973) and three companies in 1975 (Anil Fabrics, Dipti Textile 
Industries, and Nina Textile Industries) to take over the running businesses of three 
partnership firms in which the members of the Ambani family were partners. The 
growth in the first decade after the entry into manufacturing was, however, quite rapid 
(Table 3), and by 1975-76 the group had crossed the Rs. 20 crores (200 million) mark 
in terms of value of assets which at that time was the asset limit beyond which 
registration under the MRTP Act was required (even though the actual registration of 
Reliance companies under the Act was in 1978). The combined sales of the group had 
nearly touched the Rs. 100 crores (1000 million) mark by 1976-77. Thus, the Reliance 
Group had acquired fairly large dimensions even before it included any public 
company. 
As earlier, the core of the group’s business activities remained centred around the 
synthetic textile industry. While Reliance Exports occasionally dabbled in other 
business, the dominant sector in the group's operations was textiles and ultimately every 
company within the group focused itself on the textile industry. The Reliance group in 
1977 was a combination of an art-silk weaving/knitting unit, a processing house for 
synthetic fabrics and yarns, and a trader in fabrics and yarn (the indicators in Table 4 
serve to establish this). Thus while it had graduated from its purely trading enterprise 
character in the first phase, it still remained on the intersection between trading and 
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manufacturing. Moreover, while it was an organized sector unit it was actually a part 
of the ‘powerloom’ sector5.  
While the group still continued to ‘export’ as a means of securing import entitlements 
its manufacturing and selling activity was by the mid-seventies mainly directed 
towards the domestic market and its export earnings even declined. However, from 
the entry into manufacturing through the installation of imported machinery till 1977, 
the dependence of the group on imports for production and expansion activity was 
substantial (Table 5).  
Much of that expansion of the Reliance group was debt financed (Table 6), and loans 
accounted for two-thirds of its total liabilities in 1976-77. Public sector banks and 
ICICI6 were its major creditors. Even the conversion of Reliance Industries into a 
public company was initially prompted by the condition accompanying public sector 
financial institutions agreement to support to Reliance’s expansion project in 1976-77. 
All the major public sector financial institutions7 were involved in this arrangement 
under which they agreed to finance nearly 69% of the total project cost of Rs. 1250 lakhs 
(including foreign currency loans of Rs 239 lakhs), which was nearly half of the value of 
the company’s assets at that time.  
Thus it is quite clear that significant support from public sector financial institutions and 
banks at an early stage of its history was a critical element in the making of the Reliance 
story. The establishment of a close association with the Pais of the Manipal group 
(erstwhile controllers of Syndicate Bank) and with the ICICI would appear to have 
played an important role in securing this institutional finance. Even before Reliance 
                                                 
5 Organized sector refers to formally registered units/establishments/factories. In the cloth 
producing textile industry, the major component of the organized sector was classified as the 
mill sector (spinning and weaving mills) while the ‘decentralized’ sector included handloom 
units as well as weaving units using power driven looms (mainly unregistered but including 
some registered units). 
6 ICICI is presently a private sector bank. It was originally however a publicly sponsored 
industrial development bank (see 7 below) which though created in the private sector with 
shares held by banks, insurance companies, and international financial institutions, became 
effectively a government company with the nationalization of banks and insurance. 
7 The Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI), the Industrial Finance Corporation of India 
(IFCI), the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI), the Unit Trust of India 
(UTI), the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) and the General Insurance Corporation 
(GIC) and its subsidiaries 
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Textile Industries became a public company, ICICI had become a minority shareholder 
in it. There is also clear evidence of the formation of a link with the Pais. During the 
early 70s (till 1972), Reliance Exports operated a business of rubberised coir products on 
the agency of Karnataka Coir Products Ltd., a Manipal Group company. The Manipal 
Group, as mentioned earlier, also acquired in this period a minority shareholding in 
Reliance Textiles, when it was still a private company. So too did Syndicate Bank, with 
which the Pais had a close association both before and after its nationalization in 19698. 
Again, Syndicate Bank gave irrevocable guarantee in lieu of hypothecation of plant & 
machinery for Reliance's borrowing from the ICICI in this period.  MAC Investments, 
an investment company which ultimately was to become (with its eight subsidiaries), a 
crucial link in the chain connecting various Reliance companies was originally a 
subsidiary of Maharashtra Apex Corporation, another Manipal Group Company. 
Mynylon Ltd. referred to in the next paragraph was also associated with the Manipal 
group. The significance of this close personal association, with a group that had a long 
history in financial businesses, and with individuals who were part of the political 
establishment, for Reliance’s growth in this phase and thereafter cannot of course be 
calculated from any statistics. 
The first manufacturing phase of Reliance's growth came to an end with the public offer 
for the equity shares of Reliance Textiles in end 1977, and its subsequent listing on the 
Bombay and Ahmedabad Stock Exchanges in January 1978. The conversion to a public 
company was, however, done through a complex route. First Reliance Textiles was 
amalgamated into another company with no business, Mynylon Ltd., whose name was 
then changed to Reliance Textiles and its registered office shifted from Bangalore to 
Bombay. This otherwise strange sequence was apparently undertaken with the 
objective of maximizing the increase in the family holding in Reliance Industries 
before converting it into a public company. The number of shares did increase from 17 
to 59.5 lakhs on account of the amalgamation, and it is from this that the family offered 
                                                 
8 Dattaraj Salgaocar, of the Salgaocar group and son in law of Dhirubhai Ambani, in a tribute 
to his father-in-law stated that both K.K. Pai (Chairman and Managing Director of Syndicate 
Bank from 1972 to 1978, and custodian of the Bank after nationalization) and T.A. Pai 
(Chairman of Syndicate Bank before nationalization, and subsequently a Union Minister) 
were close common friends of Dhirubhai Ambani and his father in the early 1970s (Goa 
Today, August 2002). 
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28.2 lakh shares in 1977 for sale to the public in order to get the company listed on the 
stock exchanges.   
1977 to 1990: From textiles to petrochemicals 
The first public offer of shares by Reliance Textiles, and the subscription to it, did not 
bring any additional finance into the company because it only amounted to a change of 
ownership of existing shares. However, the oversubscription of that issue pointed 
towards possibilities which Reliance was then able to exploit. Recurrent large public 
capital issues became thereafter a major source of financing the rapid expansion that 
made Reliance one of the largest business groups in the country. It became the most 
significant beneficiary of the capital market boom of the 1980s (Table 7), the 
conditions for which were created by larger trends in the Indian economy and the 
consequent increase in financial savings. Public sector financial institutions continued 
to provide fairly significant financing support. However, given the scale of expansion, 
in purely relative terms this support was less significant than it had been before 1977.   
Coinciding with the transformation of Reliance Industries into a public company was 
the addition of a new dimension to the group’s growth - a consistent trend of 
proliferation of the number of its companies (Table 8). This regular increase in the 
number of investment and trading companies was associated with the need to increase 
(even if not proportionately) the shareholding of Reliance Industries that the family 
could control even as the share capital base of the company increased massively. 
Narrowly held investment and trading companies could achieve this objective by 
subscribing to shares or acquiring them through purchases and financing these by 
borrowing from institutional and non-institutional sources. The proliferation of 
companies also permitted the transfer of both the debt and the holdings from one set 
of companies to other, allowing each of them to service their own individual debt.  
The growth of Reliance Industries however still served as the barometer of the growth 
of the group (Table 9). In contrast to the earlier phase, the growth of its assets in this 
period was more rapid than of its sales. This reversal was a result of the gradual 
replacement by the group of trading and processing related sales by sales based on its 
own production and its increasing vertical integration. This happened in two stages. 
The initial expansion after Reliance Industries became a public company was within 
the textile industry itself – partly the completion of the expansion project mentioned 
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earlier which saw an increase in the number of installed looms. The group also 
entered into the spinning of yarn for the first time when it set up a new unit for the 
manufacture of man-made fibre yarn on the worsted system. The weaving and 
spinning capacities were also expanded by the acquisition of a sick industrial unit, 
Sidhpur Mills (originally belonging to the Shri Ambica group). However, even as 
Reliance Industries became through these a more conventional textile mill, it also 
ceased to grow on that basis.  
The Reliance group’s textile manufacturing capacities, measured in terms of 
spindlage and loomage, remained virtually frozen from 1979 onwards and increase in 
capacity thereafter was limited to that on account of modernization operations (Table 
10). The entire thrust of expansion shifted towards petrochemicals, which was in fact 
initiated alongside the last major expansion in textiles.  The commissioning of the 
Polyester Filament Yarn (PFY) project in 1982 marked the first realized step of this 
change in course. By the mid 1980s, Reliance had applied for and secured clearances 
(partial or complete) for expanding its PFY capacity and setting up large capacities 
for the manufacture of a range of petrochemicals – Polyester Staple Fibre (PSF), 
Purified Terepthalic Acid (PTA), Monoethylene Glycol (MEG), Linear Alkyl 
Benzene (LAB), High Density Polyethylene (HDPE), Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC), and 
Synthetic Filament Yarn including Industrial Yarn/Tyre Cord. By the end of the 
1980s, it had secured further Letters of Intent or Licenses for the manufacture of 
Ethylene, Propylene, and Butadiene, Synthetic Rubber, as well as acrylic fibre. In 
other words, its planned areas of expansion covered the entire range of the four main 
categories of petrochemicals - viz. plastics, synthetic fibres, synthetic rubber, as well 
as synthetic organic chemicals used in their manufacture. The group also in this 
period secured clearances for a few projects outside the sphere of petrochemicals - for 
the manufacture of coloured glass shells and TV tubes as well as Chlorine (with 
Caustic Soda and Hydrogen as by-products).  
Of course not all of these approvals had been converted into actual capacities by 
1990. In 1985, the capacity of the PFY plant was increased by 2.5 times and a 
horizontal diversification was achieved with the commissioning of the PSF plant. In 
1987-88, the PTA and LAB capacities were commissioned, the former representing a 
backward integration from PFY and PSF manufacture. A further step in backward 
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integration was achieved with the commencement of paraxylene production for 
manufacture of PTA in 1989. The MEG, HEG, HDPE, PVC, and Chlorine and by-
products projects were still under implementation in 1990 while those of others had 
not been initiated. 
The strategy of growth that Reliance pursued in the 1980s was thus clearly not that of 
the backward integration of a synthetic textile manufacturer. On the contrary, the 
expansion strategy adopted was one of using its base in the synthetic textile industry 
to transform itself into an enterprise with the manufacture of petrochemicals as its 
core activity. Facilitating that metamorphosis was the essential link between its earlier 
base in textiles and its new thrust in petrochemicals provided by synthetic yarns.  
Like in the earlier phase, in the petrochemical phase too the growth of Reliance was 
based on the domestic market but required an exceptional ability to command imports 
and foreign exchange. Large capital goods and technology imports were associated with 
its major foray into petrochemical manufacture in the 1980s. Further, its backward 
integration process only involved the replacement of one set of its imports of current 
inputs by another so that the imported component of its raw material consumption 
remained high throughout (Table 11).  
Explaining Reliance’s growth 
In different ways in different periods of its growth from 1958 to 1990, through its 
transitions from trading to processing and manufacturing activities, and from textiles 
to petrochemicals, the trajectory of movement of the Reliance group remained firmly 
tied to that of the synthetic textiles industry in India. Even the growth in the 1980s, 
though mainly outside the textile industry proper, was based on products that were 
part of the chain of production of synthetic textiles. In other words synthetic textiles 
provided a common thread to a process of growth that took place along the 
intersections of the textile and chemical industries, the shifting weight within whom 
was one of the features of Indian industrialization over the period. The path of rapid 
expansion that Reliance took advantage of was created by the overall trajectory of 
import-substituting industrialization based on a diffusion of technology from 
advanced capitalism.  
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The post-war period had seen the initiation of a rapid transformation in the global 
textile industry, which had till then been an extremely slow changing industry (Kroese 
1971 and 1972; Strolz 1971; Thiriez 1970). Technological changes originating in the 
textile machinery and chemical industries, the conditions of the Golden Age, and the 
new political context of the world, were the driving forces of these changes. The 
increasing use of synthetics as against natural (and even rayon) fibres, polyester being 
the most important, and the increasing speed of machinery and use of newer 
techniques like knitting were indications of the changes in textile manufacture that 
were initially most marked in the advanced economies. Alongside that, however, was 
also a redistribution of the more conventional spinning-weaving and cotton based 
textile production towards the underdeveloped economies. Synthetic fibres and their 
intermediates were products of the petrochemical industry, and a handful of advanced 
country MNCs came to initially dominated world synthetic fibre production (Read 
1986; Spitz 1988; Tisdell and Mcdonald 1979). The end of the Golden Age in the 
1970s and the consequent crisis of the synthetic fibre industry, along with the ongoing 
process of global redistribution of textile production, set the stage for a more 
widespread diffusion of synthetic fibre manufacture to the Asian continent and a 
process of import-substitution in them. 
India too was incorporated into the changes within the global textile and synthetic 
fibre industries but in its own specific way (Alam 1982; Chandrasekhar 1984; 
Chaudhuri 1994; Goswami 1991; Khanna 1984, 1989; Mishra 1993; Siddharthan & 
Narayanan 1990). The initial redistribution of world textile production did not have 
any significant impact in India. It was one of the few Third World countries that 
already had substantial textile industry and the Indian process of import-substitution 
in textiles had been completed before independence. In India instead, stagnant 
demand conditions and an increasing shift of fabric production into the 'decentralized 
sector' resulted in a protracted crisis for the organized textile industry – most acutely 
in its fabric production segment. However, there was a gradual penetration of 
synthetic fibres and a trend of change in the fibre composition of textiles. This 
penetration first took the form of imports and then synthetic fibre manufacture and the 
petrochemical industry got established in the 1960s with state support and initiative.  
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Though the growth of synthetic fibre and fibre intermediate production was in itself of 
an import-substituting kind, the growth of the synthetic textiles and fibres industry at 
the same time had a domestic production replacing character. In comparison to the 
cotton textiles that they replaced, synthetic textile growth had to be significantly more 
import-dependent for both inputs as well as technology. Foreign exchange availability 
and the import-policy environment therefore were important factors conditioning their 
growth. The greatest expansion and rapid import-substitution in these industries, 
actually took place in the 1980s so that India also came to participate in the global 
redistribution of such manufacturing. 
Notwithstanding the crisis in the organized textile industry, organized sector units did 
play an important role in the increasing penetration of synthetic fibres. To begin with, 
before the 1980s, most of the processing of yarn as well as the production of synthetic 
fabrics was undertaken by organized units – some of the traditional spinning-weaving 
mills focused on blended fabrics while organized units outside the mill sector in the 
art-silk industry specialized in synthetic fabrics. At this time, synthetic fibres were 
costly and the market for synthetic textiles was small and concentrated in the upper-
income segments. In the 1980s, however, the transmission of the global cheapening of 
synthetic fibres relative to cotton, partly through increased scales of production of 
these fibres in India, led to a greater penetration of synthetics into the mass-market for 
textiles. The more conventional ‘decentralized’ or powerloom units, however, led this 
process. Yet this meant an expansion of the market for synthetic fibres and the scope 
for growth in their manufacture behind the wall of protection from imports, and the 
production of synthetic fibres and intermediates was the natural preserve of organized 
sector units. In comparison to the other textile related activity, technological factors 
made the minimum levels of concentration in their production also significantly 
higher.     
Clearly Reliance’s trajectory of growth was one that closely reflected the overall 
pattern of expansion for organized units connected to the textile industry associated 
with the increasing penetration of synthetic fibres. It began with trading in synthetic 
fibres. It then moved into manufacturing and processing of synthetic textiles and 
processing of synthetic yarns enabling the group to grow through its participation in 
the process of substitution of cotton textiles by synthetic textiles in the upper segment 
16 
 
of the market. Since it had no history in that industry, it was able to avoid the parallel 
crisis that afflicted the cotton textiles industry. In the 1980s, as the scope for growth 
of organized sector units in synthetic textile manufacture tended to reach a plateau, 
Reliance moved backwards and tied its fortunes with the synthetic fibre and 
petrochemical industries, where the potential growth opportunities for individual 
organized sector enterprises came to be greater. The base in these industries in turn 
enabled the horizontal expansion into the manufacture of other petrochemicals that 
Reliance initiated towards the end of the decade.  
What is in addition a remarkable feature of Reliance’s growth is that even in the 
Indian context it was not a pioneering firm – whether one considers the activities with 
which the Reliance group began its manufacturing history or any one of those it 
subsequently diversified into. It was typically a later entrant in all of them, though 
usually before they had achieved full maturity. Synthetic textile manufacturing 
including both knitting and weaving units existed before 1966 and Reliance as a 
trading enterprise in fact did business with them. The spinning of synthetic fibre yarn 
began much before Reliance entered into that field in the late 1970s. Reliance’s entry 
into PFY manufacture was nearly a decade and a half after its first production in 
India, while the same gap in the case of PSF was two decades. The public sector 
Indian Petrochemicals Corporation (IPCL) initiated the manufacture of polyester 
intermediates in 1973, again a decade and a half before Reliance’s entry into them. 
Even in the case of LAB, Reliance followed IPCL and the private sector Tamil Nadu 
Petroproducts of the M.A. Chidambaram group. 
Not only was it typically a later entrant, Reliance’s entry in most of the industries was 
also as part of a generalized trend of investment in them in which other new entrants 
or incumbent firms, both private and public sector, also participated. In other words, 
the directions in which it chose to seek growth opportunities for itself were not 
typically unique.  
In its textiles phase, the Orkay group closely resembled the Reliance group. The Orkay 
group, like Reliance, was not a traditional large group, and began its business activities 
through partnership firms. Orkay Silk Mills, the principal Group Company in 1990, was 
incorporated in 1968 to take over the business of a partnership firm set up in 1957. The 
group was involved in the organized synthetic textiles industry till the 1980s, like 
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Reliance combining the knitting and weaving of textiles with the processing of fabrics 
and synthetic yarns. In the 1980s, it too like Reliance and in the same year diversified 
into the manufacture of PFY as part of a proposed expansion into chemicals9. 
In 1981, apart from Reliance and Orkay, two of the existing manufacturers of PFY, 
Petrofils Co-operative and J.K. Synthetics, were also granted approval for substantial 
increases in their capacity. Between that year and 1984, before Reliance secured 
approval for its entry into PSF manufacture, two existing units, J.K. Synthetics and 
BRPL, and two new entrants, India Polyfibres and Orissa Synthetics, secured 
approvals for a large addition to the industry capacity. Indeed in the 1980s, four-fifths 
of the capacity expansion in PFY and PSF manufacture was by some 20 odd firms 
other than Reliance. Apart from Reliance, J.K. Synthetics, Bombay Dyeing of the 
Nowrosjee Wadia group, and the public sector Bongaigaon Refinery and 
Petrochemicals (BRPL) and IPCL expanded or created capacities for polyester 
intermediate manufacture. The combining of PSF and PFY manufacture was done 
before Reliance by J.K. Synthetics, which along with BRPL also preceded Reliance in 
going in for a degree of vertical integration in polyester manufacture.  
If its expansion was still of an exceptional magnitude it was because of two features 
of Reliance’s growth: 
a) No other group or company operating in the same industries as Reliance 
managed to achieve involvement in all the industries it managed to diversify 
into through its sequence of expansion. Orkay for example matched its 
trajectory up to the point of entry into polyester manufacture but not 
thereafter. BRPL, manufacturing paraxylene, Dimethyl Terepthalate (DMT), 
and PSF, came the closest to Reliance’s petrochemical product profile, but did 
not have the same involvement in the textile industry. Neither did IPCL, a 
producer of paraxylene and DMT, and a host of other petrochemicals in whose 
production Reliance was still creating its entry capacities in 1990. Other 
private groups combining involvement in the textile and synthetic fibre 
industries on the other hand had no presence in fibre intermediate and 
                                                 
9 The sanctions for the establishment of PFY plants by Reliance and Orkay were on the same 
date. 
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petrochemical industries, with the exception of the limited captive capacities 
for DMT and MEG of the JK group. Bombay Dyeing produced one fibre 
intermediate, DMT, but the Nowrosjee Wadia group was not involved in 
synthetic fibre manufacture.   
b) In both its textiles phase as well petrochemicals phases, the Reliance group 
managed to secure for itself a larger share in the expansion in its chosen areas 
as compared to most other enterprises participating in it. In each venture that it 
undertook, Reliance acquired a dominant position despite being a later entrant. 
Its large share in 1990 in petrochemical products has already been highlighted. 
In its earlier phase, Reliance also clearly became one of the dominant 
enterprises within the organized art-silk industry. The emergence of a 
dominant firm of the type that Reliance became in either phase was in itself a 
likely possibility given the inherently concentrated structure of the industries it 
operated in. In its textiles phase, the limited size of the upper end of the 
market for synthetic textiles, the prevalence of non-price competition in it, and 
the restricted access of firms to imported machinery and inputs, gave it an 
inherently oligopolistic character. In synthetic fibre and petrochemical 
manufacture, the existence of significant economies of scale made for highly 
concentrated industries. Indeed, as the Reliance group graduated from the 
synthetic textiles to fibres and then to the fibre intermediates industries, it 
moved in the direction of industries where scale factors were more and more 
significant. This made the sequence of its diversification something that could 
not be easily replicated by a number of firms. By achieving it, the Reliance 
group successively left behind other enterprises competing with it in an earlier 
stage of its expansion, even as its scales of production and vertical integration 
reinforced its position vis-à-vis these competitors.  
To sum it up then, the story that the Reliance group scripted for itself over its life span 
from its birth to 1990, a short span of two and a half decades, had its objective basis in 
factors largely originating outside the group itself, and in making which it had little 
direct contribution or influence. The path that Reliance traversed to become one of the 
largest business groups in India was a creation of the specific pattern of 
industrialization in the post-independence period. Like other traditionally dominant 
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Indian business groups, it used foreign technology as the basis for taking advantage of 
that path and was not a technological innovator. Like them it also made significant 
use of external finance – from both public sector institutions as the capital market in 
the 1980s. Even the boom in the capital issues market was something that had its basis 
in the increased significance of financial savings of the household sector that emerged 
from the late 1970s. The investment opportunities the Reliance group used were also 
not in areas overlooked by other firms or considered too risky by them. At each stage 
the group was induced to move in particular directions by a combination of its own 
past history as well as the operation of generalized inducements to which other firms 
also responded. But in its entire sequence of diversification across phases, and the 
consequent ultimate combination across industries, in its relative position in each 
industry and the capital issues market, as well as in the scale of its expansion, 
Reliance was unique amongst all these enterprises10. But here again objective 
circumstances dictated that the Reliance kind of story at least in terms of its 
magnitude had to be a somewhat unique one.  
It says something about the nature of Indian capitalism and its capitalist class that 
such a remarkable story of movement to the top of the corporate hierarchy in India as 
Reliance’s was based on so little of what could be considered as expressions of 
industrial entrepreneurship. The only two related things that can be identified as the 
key to separating Reliance from others, those that made Reliance rather than any of its 
actual and potential rivals the most successful exploiter of the opportunities that were 
in principle open to other firms, were its exceptional success in gaining from the 
regulatory regime and in mobilizing finance.   
Reliance’s expansion was achieved in the context of rivalry with other firms which 
played itself out not primarily in the marketplace but in the determining of the 
preconditions or parameters of market rivalry. The execution of the growth strategy of 
Reliance and its rivals necessarily involved multiple points of interaction with the 
prevailing regulatory regime. Every industry Reliance entered into was governed by 
the industrial licensing policy so that capacity creation had to be ‘approved’. Once it 
                                                 
10 This statement needs a small qualification in that in terms of the absolute increase in size 
between 1966 and 1990, the Tata and Birla groups achieved a greater expansion than 
Reliance. 
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became registered under the MRTP Act, additional approvals were required. Foreign 
collaboration and imports too required approvals and import licenses. If public sector 
institutions were the sources of institutional finance, capital issues too were subject to 
government approval. The levels of taxes, excise duties and import duties were also 
crucial in determining profitability and market prospects in the industries Reliance 
operated in. Of course, Reliance was not subject to any exceptional regulation and nor 
was it the only firm to try and use the regulatory regime to its advantage. The 
evidence, however, does indicate that Reliance’s success in getting a favourable 
configuration of decisions by State agencies was rather exceptional through most of 
its history:  
i. The direct results of favourable decisions on the financing side of Reliance’s 
growth were the support of the public sector financial institutions and the 
approvals for making use of the potential for capital issues in the 1980s. It is in 
the latter that Reliance proved to be somewhat ‘innovative’ and the use of this 
mode of financing also contributed to reduction in costs of finance. The 
consequent improvement in profitability in turn also increased the availability 
of retained earnings for financing expansion. Adding to this was the fact that 
Reliance paid virtually no taxes on its profits for two decades – taking 
advantage of available concessions.  
ii. While it managed to secure licenses and MRTP approvals for what were then 
fairly large capacity creations/expansions in the petrochemicals industries, 
Reliance also benefited from the fact that rivals who might have created 
barriers to its entry by creating similar capacities or diversified structures 
before Reliance were denied similar approvals. A perusal of 
rejections/approvals under the MRTP Act for capacity creation, for example, 
reveals that the Thapar group's proposal for setting up a PFY plant with a larger 
capacity than that created by Reliance, and made before Reliance actually began 
its production, was rejected after two years. By contrast, just a year after, 
Reliance's proposal for substantially increasing its capacity was approved in the 
same month in which the application was made. Similarly, the Shri Ram group's 
LAB proposal made before Reliance was also rejected as were those of others 
subsequently. Not only applications of other groups for large capacities, but 
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also those that could have created other similarly vertically or horizontally 
integrated petrochemical manufacturers as Reliance were also rejected – for 
instance, the Thapar group's applications for both PFY and PTA, and of the JK 
Singhania group for PFY, PSF and PTA.  
It had been widely alleged that Reliance’s succeeded in installing capacities that 
were much larger than its stated and licensed capacities and these allegations 
were even translated into official charges made by the customs authorities 
Mohnot (1987). As far as evidence goes, it is true that Reliance Industries actual 
production figures for PFY were much higher than its stated installed capacity, 
almost double in 1989-90. Similarly, in the case of PTA production, in its very 
first year of operation, Reliance’s PTA plant produced 25% over its stated 
capacity. Though it was not the only manufacturer with a capacity utilization of 
over 100%, the gap between its production and the industry average per unit was 
larger than that in the respective capacities. 
iii. Not only was Reliance able to be a major net user of scarce foreign exchange 
throughout its expansion path, its raw material consumption and technology 
imports were more foreign currency intensive than of its peers. Also, in the 
1980s the raising of customs duties on imports of certain products and the 
lowering of excise duties on the same at times coincided with Reliance’s 
switch from importing the product to producing it. Thus, in the case of both 
PFY and PSF, Reliance’s entry was followed by sharp rises in customs duties 
on imports of these products and in the case of the latter, there was also a 
parallel reduction in excise duties.  
The success that Reliance achieved on the financing side, in combination with that in 
securing approvals, enabled Reliance to pursue a strategy – encompassing the 
combination of industries, degree of vertical integration, scales of production and 
technology choices – different from those of any of its rivals. Apart from allowing it 
to achieve a larger size these also proved Reliance a decisive advantage when the 
polyester industry faced difficulties because of overcapacity in the late 1980s and 
some firms turned sick.    
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Conclusion 
The phenomenal success of Reliance was very much a product of the pre-1991 regime 
of Indian capitalism, though it was also able to make use of that success as the 
foundation to benefit greatly from the subsequent liberalization process. This of 
course begs the question – was Reliance truly an outsider which forced its way into 
the Indian business elite by achieving business success overcoming the disadvantages 
of not being initially a part of it? Or was its success itself based on it finding a way to 
becoming a privileged insider and making use of the means made available by that 
privilege? On balance, it would seem that the Reliance story was a specific reflection 
of the fact that in Indian capitalism business success has heavily relied upon securing 
means – finance, technology and state support – from the outside rather than on 
creating technological and managerial capabilities within firms that would be 
proprietary in nature. Many, though not all, older members of the business elite were 
able to use precisely this feature to transform their enterprises and grow even as the 
industrial landscape changed and the industries in which they had originally 
established themselves declined in importance. Reliance’s success and the way it was 
achieved, however, serves to establish that the degree of influence commanded by a 
business firm did not have a simple relationship with its past business success as the 
causality also operated in the other direction. The growth of Reliance and the survival 
in the elite of those it joined thus had common roots – highlighting in the process the 
persistence of the mercantile element in Indian capitalism. To that extent, it cannot 
really be said that the rise of Reliance was an expression of a fundamental 
transformation in the nature of India’s capitalist class. That the ability to influence 
government decisions has been an important facet of Reliance’s success even after 
1991 (Guhathakurta 2014) would suggest that some essential features of Indian 
capitalism have survived the transition to liberalization.     
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RELIANCE INDUSTRIES LTD.          M ANIL FABRICS LTD.            M NAVKETAN COMMERCIALS PVT. LTD.
DIPTI TEXTILE INDUSTRIES LTD.         M RAJKIRAN SYNTHETICS LTD.
NINA TEXTILE INDUSTRIES LTD.        M RISHIRAJ MERCHANDISE LTD.
RELIANCE PETROCHEMICALS LTD.        M RELIANCE EXPORTS LTD.          M SHRUTI TRADERS LTD.
THYRISTORS CONTROL LTD.        M
VIMAL FABRICS LTD.            M
CYMROZA TRADING PVT. LTD.
DEVTI FABRICS LTD.         M
TRISHNA INVESTMENT & LEASING LTD.           M ADVITIYA FABRICS LTD.
KUNJVAN TEXFAB LTD.
NEELASHISH INVESTMENT CO. LTD.
ORSON TRADING LTD.
RAJKIRAN FINANCE & LEASING LTD.
ORNAMENTAL TRADING ENTERPRISES LTD. RISHIRAJ FINANCE & LEASING LTD.
SANATAN HOLDINGS & TRADING LTD.
JAGDANAND INVESTMENTS & TRADING CO. LTD. AAVARAN TEXTILES LTD. SANATAN TEXTRADE LTD.
KANKHAL INVESTMENTS & TRADING CO. PVT. LTD. ASCENT TRADECOM LTD. SHRENIK TRADERS LTD.
KASHTOP TRADING PVT. LTD. ATLANTA TEXTILES PVT. LTD. VASISTHA FINANCE & LEASING LTD.
KIRTAN TRADING PVT. LTD. BARKHA INVESTMENT & TRADING CO. PVT. LTD. VASISTHA TRADECOM LTD.
KUDRAT INVESTMENT & LEASING  (INDIA) LTD. BIRAAJ TEXTILES TRADING LTD.
MAANSI TRADING PVT. LTD. BLOOM TRADING LTD.
MARKSON TRADING LTD. CAPABLE COMMERCIALS  LTD. CONCORD COMMERCIAL PVT. LTD.
MITUL TRADING LTD. DADHICHI  TRADERS LTD. LORDWEST INVESTMENT & TRADING LTD.
NIKHIL INVESTMENT CO. LTD. DADHICHI TEXFAB LTD. VITA INVESTMENTS & TRADING CO. PVT. LTD.
NIM INVESTMENT & LEASING LTD. ELITE MERCANTILE  LTD.
REAL INVESTMENT CO. LTD. GAYLORD INVESTMENTS & TRADING CO. LTD. ABHINAV FINANCE & LEASING CO. PVT. LTD.
SCOTLINE TRADING LTD. HERO TEXTILE & TRADING LTD. ALAKH FINANCE & LEASING PVT. LTD.
INNOVA TRADECOM LTD. ALAKH TRADERS
DADHICHI INVESTMENTS PVT. LTD. INSPIRATIONS INVESTMENT & TRADING CO. PVT. LTD. ALISHA TEXFAB PVT. LTD.
PROLINE INVESTMENTS PVT. LTD. JOGIYA TRADERS LTD. CLARION INVESTMENT & TRADING CO. PVT. LTD.
SHANGRILA INVESTMENTS & TRADING CO. PVT. LTD. KAVERI COMMERCIALS LTD. DAINTY INVESTMENTS & LEASING LTD.
VAYUDOOT FINANCE & LEASING LTD. KUNJIVAN FINANCE & LEASING PVT. LTD. FIERY INVESTMENTS & LEASING PVT. LTD.
VICRAZE INVESTMENTS & TRADING CO. PVT. LTD. MUDRA COMMUNICATIONS PVT. LTD. MADONNA COMMERCIALS LTD.
YASHASVI HOLDINGS PVT. LTD. NIHARIKA SYNTHETICS TRADING LTD. NACHIKETA INVESTMENT & TRADING CO. PVT. LTD.
OPERA INVESTMENTS & TRADING PVT. LTD. PRATIKSHA FINANCE & LEASING LTD.
ORATOR TRADING ENTERPRISES LTD. SANMAN FINANCE & LEASING LTD.
PRATIK HOLDINGS & TRADING PVT. LTD. SHERLON TRADING LTD.
PURURAVA TRADERS LTD. SHERON TEXTILES LTD.
CHANDRAGUPTA TRADERS LTD. RADHARAMAN TEXTILES TRADING LTD. SRICHAKRA TEXTILES PVT. LTD.
HANSDHWANI TRADING CO. LTD. RAJNIKETAN TRADERS LTD. SWADEE CHEMICALS LTD.
MAC INVESTMENT LTD. RELIANCE CONSULTANCY SERVICES LTD.
SINCERE LEASING & INVESTMENTS LTD. RELIANCE TRANSPORT & TRAVELS LTD. RADIANT TEXFAB LTD.
SANDOZ TEXTILES & TRADING LTD.
SITCOM COMMERCIALS LTD. MANOR TRADING LTD.
SPELLBOUND TRADING LTD.
UNICOM TRADING ENTERPRISES LTD. CANTONY TRADING ENTERPRISES LTD.
VATAYAN SYNTHETICS LTD. LAZOR DETERGENTS PVT. LTD.
VISION TRADING CO. PVT. LTD. MEHER MERCANTILE LTD.
NAVYUG HOLDINGS LTD.
PROLAB SYNTHETICS & DETERGENTS PVT. LTD.
CREDITABLE INVESTMENTS LTD. SANKET COMMERCIALS LTD.
SOUMYA FINANCE  & LEASING CO. LTD. SINORA TRADING LTD.
UTKARSH TEXTILES TRADING LTD.
VERONICA TRADING LTD.
CEZARI INVESTMENT & TRADING CO. PVT. LTD. ALKELITE INTERMEDIATES PVT. LTD.
HERCULES INVESTMENTS LTD. CHANDRAVADAN INVESTMENT PVT. LTD. ALMANAC TEXTILES PVT. LTD.
JAGDISHWAR INVESTMENT & TRADING CO. LTD. GURUVAS TEXTILES LTD. IMAGE HOLDINGS PVT. LTD.
KEDARESHWAR INVESTMENT & TRADING LTD. LAZOR SYNTEX LTD. WISDEN TEXFAB LTD.
NEHAL HOLDINGS & TRADING CO. PVT. LTD. MAXWELL DYES & DETERGENTS PVT. LTD.
ORSON INVESTMENT & TRADING LTD. OSCAR CHEMICALS PVT. LTD. ADAMSON COMMERCIALS LTD.
PAMS INVESTMENT & TRADING CO. LTD. PARADOX TRADERS LTD./ORNATE NAVJYOTI HOLDING PVT. LTD.
RIYAZ INVESTMENT & TRADING LTD. SILKINA TRADING LTD. NOVELTY HOLDINGS LTD.
RIYAZ TRADING LTD. ORAGON FABRICS LTD.
Notes: 1. Cos. marked ` M' are those which were registered under MRTPAct in 1990; 2. All arrows originate from company(ies) holding the shares; 3. Arrows to/from 
top/bottom of box valid for all companies in the box, and arrows to/from the sides valid only companies in the relevant sub-box
FIGURE V.1: STRUCTURE OF INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN COMPANIES OF THE OF THE RELIANCE GROUP IN THE LATE 1980s, Part A 
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BOX A BOX B
AAVARAN TEXTILES LTD. AAKARSH FINANCE & INVESTMENTS LTD.
ADAMSON COMMERCIALS LTD. ABHIMANYU TRADERS LTD.
AKHIL FABRICS LTD. ADVITIYA HOLDINGS LTD.
ALAKH FINANCE & LEASING PVT. LTD. ARISTOCRAT FINANCE & LEASING CO. PVT. LTD.
ALISHA TEXFAB PVT. LTD. AVSHESH FINANCE & LEASING LTD.
ALMANAC TEXTILES PVT. LTD. BHRUGESH TRADERS LTD.
ASCENT TRADECOM LTD. CHALLENGE HOLDINGS & TRADING CO. PVT. LTD.
BARKHA INVESTMENT & TRADING CO. PVT. LTD. CHANCE INVESTMENT & TRADING LTD.
BIRAAJ TEXTILES TRADING LTD. CHITRAKALA INVESTMENT TRADE  & BUSINESS FINANCE LTD.
BLOOM TRADING LTD. DEVAL INVESTMENTS & TRADING CO. PVT. LTD.
CANTONY TRADING ENTERPRISES LTD. DHANRAJ INVESTMENTS & TRADING COMPANY LTD.
CAPABLE COMMERCIALS LTD. ESTEEM TEXTILES TRADING CO. LTD.
CARESS TEXTILES LTD. EVESLAND PVT. LTD.
CEZARI INVESTMENT & TRADING CO. PVT. LTD. EXPRESS LEASING LTD.
CHANDRAGUPTA TRADERS LTD. GENERAL INVESTMENT & COMMERCIAL CORPORATION LTD.
CHANDRAVADAN INVESTMENT PVT. LTD. GOPALKRISHNA INVESTMENT & TRADING LTD.
CLARION INVESTMENT & TRADING CO. PVT. LTD. GUNSUNDARI TRADING CO. LTD.
CONCORD COMMERCIAL PVT. LTD. GURJARI HOLDINGS & TRADING PVT. LTD.
CYMROZA TRADING PVT. LTD. HEJMADY FINANCE & TRADING LTD.
DADHICHI  TRADERS LTD. HOPE HOLDINGS & TRADING CO. PVT. LTD.
DADHICHI INVESTMENTS PVT. LTD. INDUSTRIAL CREDIT & DEV. SYNDICATE LTD.
DADHICHI TEXFAB LTD. MADONNA INVESTMENTS & LEASING LTD.
ELITE MERCANTILE LTD. MANIPAL FINANCE CORPORATION LTD.
GURUVAS TEXTILES LTD. MEDHA TRADERS LTD.
HANSDHWANI TRADING CO. LTD. MEGHNAD TRADERS LTD.
HERCULES INVESTMENTS LTD. MORGAN INVESTMENT & COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES LTD.
HERO TEXTILE & TRADING LTD. N G PRITT PVT. LTD.
INNOVA TRADECOM LTD. NAVKETAN HOLDINGS & TRADING LTD.
INSPIRATIONS INVESTMENT & TRADING CO. PVT. LTD. NEHAL TRADING & INVESTMENTS LTD.
JAGDANAND INVESTMENTS & TRADING CO. LTD. PANCHWATI TRADING  CO.   LTD.
JAGDISHWAR INVESTMENT & TRADING CO. LTD. PATALGANGA TEXTILES PVT. LTD.
JOGIYA TRADERS LTD. PIONEER HOLDINGS PVT. LTD.
KANKHAL INVESTMENTS & TRADING CO. PVT. LTD. PLACEWELL COMMUNICATIONS LTD.
KASHTOP TRADING PVT. LTD. PRADEEP SANDEEP TRADING & INVESTMENT (P) LTD.
KAVERI COMMERCIALS LTD. R P K INVESTMENTS & CONSULTANCY LTD.
KEDARESHWAR INVESTMENT & TRADING LTD. RAJKAMAL HOLDINGS & TRADING LTD.
KIRTAN TRADING PVT. LTD. RAKSHA TRADING LTD.
KUNJVAN FINANCE & LEASING PVT. LTD. LTD. RAMCHANDRA HOLDINGS & TRADING LTD.
LORDWEST INVESTMENT & TRADING LTD. RANJANA TRADERS PVT. LTD.
MAANSI TRADING PVT. LTD. SAPNA FINANCE P LTD.
MAC INVESTMENT LTD. SEA ROCK INVESTMENTS LTD.
MANOR TRADING LTD. SIHASAN HOLDINGS & TRADING LTD.
MARKSON TRADING LTD. SPARSH TRADING & INVESTMENTS LTD.
MAXWELL DYES & DETERGENTS PVT. LTD. SPRING HOLDINGS & TRADING LTD.
MEHER MERCANTILE LTD. STIRRINGS TRADING LTD.
MITUL TRADING LTD. VELVET TRADING PVT. LTD.
MUDRA COMMUNICATIONS PVT. LTD. VIBHISHAN TRADERS LTD.
NACHIKETA INVESTMENT & TRADING CO. PVT. LTD.
NAVKETAN COMMERCIALS PVT. LTD.
NEELASHISH INVESTMENT CO. LTD.
NEHAL HOLDINGS & TRADING CO. PVT. LTD.
NIHARIKA SYNTHETICS TRADING LTD.
NIKHIL INVESTMENT CO. LTD.
OPERA INVESTMENTS & TRADING PVT. LTD.
ORAGON FABRICS LTD.
ORATOR TRADING ENTERPRISES LTD.
ORNAMENTAL TRADING ENTERPRISES LTD.
ORSON INVESTMENT & TRADING LTD.
PAMS INVESTMENT & TRADING CO. LTD.
PARADOX TRADERS LTD.
PRATIK HOLDINGS & TRADING PVT. LTD.
PROLINE INVESTMENTS PVT. LTD.
PURURAVA TRADERS LTD.
RADHARAMAN TEXTILES TRADING LTD.
RADIANT TEXFAB LTD.
RAJKIRAN FINANCE & LEASING LTD.
RAJNIKETAN TRADERS LTD. SINORA TRADING LTD.
REAL INVESTMENT CO. LTD. SITCOM COMMERCIALS LTD.
RELIANCE CONSULTANCY SERVICES LTD. SPELLBOUND TRADING LTD.
RELIANCE TRANSPORT & TRAVELS LTD. SRICHAKRA TEXTILES PVT. LTD.
RISHIRAJ FINANCE & LEASING LTD. UNICOM TRADING ENTERPRISES LTD.
RIYAZ TRADING LTD. UTKARSH TEXTILES TRADING LTD.
ROSSVEL TEXTILES TRADING  PVT. LTD. VASISTHA FINANCE & LEASING LTD.
SANATAN HOLDINGS & TRADING LTD. VATAYAN SYNTHETICS LTD.
SANDOZ TEXTILES & TRADING LTD. VAYUDOOT FINANCE & LEASING LTD.
SANKET COMMERCIALS LTD. VERONICA TRADING LTD.
SANMAN FINANCE & LEASING LTD. VICRAZE INVESTMENTS & TRADING CO. PVT. LTD.
SANTOOR COMMERCIALS PVT. LTD. VIMAL FABRICS LTD.
SCOTLINE TRADING LTD. VISION TRADING CO. PVT. LTD.
SHANGRILA INVESTMENTS & TRADING CO. PVT. LTD. VITA INVESTMENTS & TRADING CO. LTD.
SILKINA TRADING LTD. WISDEN TEXFAB LTD.
FIG. 1B: STRUCTURE OF INTERCONNECTIONS, RELIANCE GROUP, PART B
Note: Companies in Box A appear in Fig. 1A too.
BOX A (Continued)
RELIANCE INDUSTRIES LTD.
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Tables 
Table 1: Number of Companies and Reliance Share in Installed Capacity in Selected 
Industries, 1990 
Product Number of Companies Percentage Share of Reliance in Total Industry 
Installed Capacity 
PFY 16  24.41  
24.41  
24.41  
PSF 10  22.95  
22.95  
22.95  
LAB 3  42.86  
42.86  
42.86  
PTA 1 (4) 100.00 (42.55) 
100.00 (42.55) 
100.00 (42.55) 
Paraxylene 3 74.59 
74.59 
74.59 
Figures in brackets represent the position with regard to the aggregate of PTA and its substitute, DMT. 
Source: DGTD, Handbook of Indigenous Manufacturers, 1990; CMIE, Markets & Market Shares, 
1991; GOI, BICP (1994).  
Table 2: Production Shares and Market Shares of Reliance Industries in 1989-90 
(Percentages to Industry Totals) 
Product Reliance Share in 
Production 
Reliance Share in Sales 
Quantity Value 
PFY 38.04 N.A. N.A. 
PSF 41.93 44.32 33.61 
LAB 38.54 45.53 43.78 
PTA 100.00 (50.35) 100.00 100.00 
Paraxylene 76.89   
Source: CMIE, Markets & Market Shares, 1991and GOI, BICP (1994). 
 
Table 3: Selected Balance Sheet Items of Reliance Group Companies, 1970-71 and 1976-
77 (Values in Rs. Lakhs) 
Year Share Capital Net Worth Gross Block Net Block Total Assets/Liabilities 
RELIANCE TEXTILE INDUSTRIES 
1970-71 65 152.18 289.14 265.03 399.81 
1976-77 595.11 954.16 1699.92 1451.45 2910.87 
TOTAL for All 6 Group Companies 
1970-71 65 152.18 289.14 265.03 399.81 
1976-77 655.33 1023.37 1756.91 1489.03 3082.93 
Source: Company Balance Sheets 
26 
 
Table 4: Indicators of Manufacturing Activity and Capacities of Reliance Group 
Companies, 1975-76 and 1976-77 (Yarn quantities in kilograms and Fabric quantities in 
metres) 
Item Total for 4 companies 
 1975-76 1976-77 
Raw Materials Consumed 
Yarn 2101253  2416260  
Fabrics (Grey) 8648496  6089677  
Production 
Crimped Yarn 1498450  1762983  
Fabrics 15273260  14391274  
Installed Capacity (Numbers/Spindles) 
Looms 246  246  
Knitting Machines 34  34  
Crimping Machines 2848  2848  
Twisting Machines 20  20  
Source: Company Annual Reports 
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Table 5: Import Intensity of Reliance Textile Industries Investment and 
Production, 1975-76 and 1976-77 (Values in Rupees Lakhs) 
 1975-76 1976-77 
1. Imports 
Raw Materials 420 350 
Dyes, Chemicals, Stores and Spare parts 18 16 
Capital Goods 84 154 
Total Imports 522 520 
2. Import Intensity of Investment 
Capital Goods Imports as percentage of Increase in Plant and 
Machinery 
28 49.68 
3. Import Intensity in Current Costs 
Share of Imports in Consumption of Raw Materials and Dyes, 
Chemicals, etc 
41.15 48.24 
Source: Company Annual Reports 
Table 6: Structure of Liabilities of the Reliance Group, 1970-71 to 1976-77 
Year Percentage to Total Liabilities 
Net Worth Secured Loans Unsecured 
loans 
Total Liabilities 
Reliance Textile Industries 
1970-71 38.06 48.10 13.84 100.00 
1971-72 37.73 61.16 1.11 100.00 
1972-73 33.72 65.43 0.85 100.00 
1973-74 35.79 63.50 0.71 100.00 
1974-75 40.63 59.24 0.06 100.00 
1975-76 37.79 60.70 1.44 100.00 
1976-77 32.78 65.04 2.18 100.00 
All Group Companies 
1970-71 38.06 48.10 13.84 100.00 
1971-72 37.73 61.16 1.11 100.00 
1972-73 33.72 65.43 0.85 100.00 
1973-74 35.78 63.46 0.76 100.00 
1974-75 40.63 59.14 0.16 100.00 
1975-76 38.36 62.11 1.43 100.00 
1976-77 33.19 63.84 2.20 100.00 
Source: Company Balance Sheets 
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Table 7: Public Capital Issues by the Private Corporate Sector, 1980-81 to 1989-90  
Group   No. of Issues Amount Raised (Rs. 
Crores) 
Percentage to Total Capital 
Issues 
Large Issues (Over Rupees 50 Crores) 
Reliance 8 1749.00 9.16 
Tata 10 1261.76 6.61 
Birla 11 1024.93 5.37 
L & T 4 994.19 5.21 
Oswal Agro 4 871.72 4.56 
Usha Rectifier 3 714.50 3.74 
Essar 3 506.53 2.65 
Total Issues 4938 19096.54 100 
Reliance (All Issues) 13 1833.79 9.60 
Source: Misra, B.M (1993) 
 
Table 8: Increase in the Number of Companies of the Reliance Group, 1978 to 1989 
Year-> 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Companies Registered 
in the Year 
6 7 2 10 17 21 31 6 49 5 2 5 
Cumulative Total of 
Group Companies 
12 19 21 31 48 69 100 106 155 160 162 167 
Note: The above table excludes companies for whom the relevant information was not available. 7 
companies that were registered earlier but acquired during this period have also not been included. 
Source: Company Memorandums of Association and Directory of Joint Stock Companies, 1990 
Table 9: Growth of Reliance Industries: 1977-78 to 1989-90 (Values in Rupees Crores) 
Year Share Capital Net Worth Net Fixed 
Assets 
Total 
Assets/Liabilities 
Sales 
1977-78(15) 6.25 14.44 25.03 57.98 120.11 
1979 7.84 23.63 37.74 85.42 155.13 
1980 12.36 31.79 57.95 124.66 214.58 
1981 16.97 57.09 105.56 222.51 312.22 
1982 24.40 91.54 314.61 317.98 421.03 
1983 41.95 129.88 321.46 388.42 520.35 
1984 51.98 246.39 426.28 490.45 622.01 
1985 57.41 311.12 606.80 946.76 733.14 
1986 57.41 311.53 949.46 1137.34 905.48 
1987-88(18) 157.90 1022.12 1584.08 1956.69 1770.74 
1988-89(9) 157.91 1071.31 1502.78 2123.65 1112.45 
1989-90 157.92 1086.98 1469.01 2203.31 1840.66 
Note: Figures in brackets indicate number of months in the relevant accounting period when different from a year 
Source: Company Annual Reports 
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Table 10: Installed Capacity of Reliance Group Companies, 1977-78 to 1989-90 
 TEXTILES PETROCHEMICALS 
Product-
> 
Cotton/Blended/ 
Crimped Yarn 
MMF Fabrics PFY PSF PTA LAB 
Unit-> Spindles/
Nos. 
Crimping and 
Twisting 
Machines/Nos. 
Looms/ 
Nos. 
Knitting 
Machines/
Nos. 
M.T. M.T. M.T. M.T. 
End-Year RELIANCE INDUSTRIES 
1977-78 0  61  450  22  0  0  0  0  
1979 9582  80  450  22  0  0  0  0  
1980 12494  122  450  22  0  0  0  0  
1981 50682  130  940  22  0  0  0  0  
1982 50682  200  940  22  10000  0  0  0  
1983 50682  221  940  22  10000  0  0  0  
1984 50682  0  940  22  10000  0  0  0  
1985 12494  0  450  18  25125  45000  0  0  
1986 12494  0  450  16  25125  45000  0  0  
1987-88 12494  0  450  20  25125  45000  100000  60000  
1988-89 12494  0  450  20  25125  45000  100000  60000  
1989-90 12494  0  450  20  25125  45000  100000  60000  
 DEVTI FABRICS 
1986  36448  0  490  0  0  0  0  0  
1987  35496  0  490  0  0  0  0  0  
1988-89 36546  0  490  0  0  0  0  0  
1989-90 37536  0  490  0  0  0  0  0  
Source: Company Annual Reports 
Table 11: Import Intensity of Current Consumption of Reliance Industries, 1977-78 to 
1989-90 (Percentage Share of Imports in) 
Raw material 
Consumption 
Dyes, Chemicals, Spares and 
Parts Consumed 
Total 
56.77 37.00 54.67 
Source: Company Annual Reports 
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